ON  FORMULATION 
IN  PSYCHOANALYSIS 


FREDERIC  LYMAN  WELLS 

McLean  Hospital,  Waverley,  Mass. 


REPRINTED  FROM 


THE  JOURNAL  OF  ABNORAIAL 

PSYCHOLOGY 

BOSTON 


October-November,  1913 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2017  with  funding  from 

University  of  Illinois  Urbana-Champaign  Alternates 


https://archive.org/details/onformulationinpOOwell 


ON  FORMULATION  IN  PSYCHOANALYSIS' 


BY  FREDERIC  LYMAN  WELLS 

McLean  Hospital^  Waverley,  Mass, 

IT  has  been  the  writer’s  fortune  to  have  many  times  to 
reply  to  the  impossible  question,  Do  you  believe  in 
psychoanalysis?  One  cannot  answer  it  simply,  but 
must  consider  its  object  in  three  ways:  as  a method  of 
research,  as  a therapeutic  agent,  as  a system  of  psychological 
theories.  The  first  two  are  not  to  detain  us  now.  That  the 
best  way  to  know  how  the  mind  acts  is  to  observe  it  in  action, 
and  that  the  best  way  to  observe  it  is  by  the  most  complete 
possible  account  of  what  takes  place  in  it,  is  a proposition 
so  obvious  as  to  call  for  little  criticism.  But  upon  the  basis 
of  a body  of  observational  data,  probably  the  most  intimate 
ever  focussed  upon  psychological  questions,  are  constructed 
many  theories  of  mental  function,  scarcely  one  of  which 
has  been  assimilated  to  the  psychology  of  scientific  method. 
So  far  as  my  vision  will  reach,  this  failure  is  due  very  largely 
to  matters  of  formulation.  Here  the  task  must  be  to  look 
beneath  the  surface,  and  to  study  how  they  can  best  be 
formulated  so  as  to  render  them  assimilable  with  more 
orthodox  standards  of  psychological  thought. 

An  entertaining  volume  recently  come  from  the  pen 
of  a Belgian  philologer  is  largely  given  to  maintaining  the 
importance  of  being  accurate  as  well  as  earnest.  In  formu- 
lating theories  for  scientific  judgment,  we  must  not  allow  our 
phraseology  to  be  regulated  by  autistic  fancies,  but  recog- 
nize that  in  language  we  are  utilizing  an  important  function 

IRead  at  the  Fourth  Annual  Meeting  of  the  Psychopathological  Association 
at  Washington,  May  8,  1913. 


3 


4 


On  Formulation  in  Psychoanalysis 


of  paramountly  social  significance,  not  to  be  dissipated  in 
philologic  self-abuse.  I feel  strongly  that  an  ameliorated 
formulation  will  not  only  make  it  easier  for  every  one  to 
appreciate  adequately  what  is  already  known,  but  will 
obviate  many  natural  barriers  of  resistance  to  the  correct 
interpreting  of  future  observations.  The  argument  is  not 
about  whether  facts  are  facts,  but  whether  they  are  stated 
and  thought  of  with  effective  objectivity. 

The  issues  contributing  most  to  these  formulatory 
difficulties  are  three  in  number;  the  concepts  of  the  wish,  of 
symbolism,  and  of  sexuality;  in  which  order  these  remarks 
are  to  briefly  take  them  up. 

The  primal  difficulty  with  the  psychoanalytic  use  of 
the  term  wish  is  its  well-nigh  universal  interpretation  as  a 
process  of  high  mental  level.  The  psychoanalytic  common- 
places of  unconscious  wish,  wish  unacceptable  to  the  main 
body  of  the  personality,  are  to  most  of  those  who  hear  them, 
contradictions  in  terms.  To  wish  a thing  means  to  desire 
it  consciously,  and  with  the  main  body  of  the  personality. 

It  is  not  in  the  least  denied  that  the  processes  described 
in  these  terms  exist,  and  their  recognition  is  most  important; 
but  beware  the  consequences  of  new  psychological  wine  in 
old  linguistic  bottles.  We  certainly  know  that  the  mental 
organism  is  not  a close-knit,  well-disciplined  absolute 
monarchy,  whose  every  member  responds  fatally  to  di- 
rection from  the  highest  levels;  rather  is  it  a loosely  gathered 
democracy,  often  with  most  liberal  notions  of  State  Rights. 
Seldom,  indeed,  is  it  altogether  united  on  single  questions  of 
policy.  The  majority  of  the  Ichkomplex  may  be  able  to 
enforce  its  decrees  only  with  difficulty  against  a riotous 
minority;  which,  if  it  be  a sufficiently  well  organized  com- 
plex, may  split  off  and  set  up  a local  government  of  its  own; 
or  even  seize  the  reins  of  the  central  authority,  and  carry 
on  according  to  its  own  schizophrenic  inclinations. 

It  is  thus  a far  from  infrequent  experience  that  one 
may  wish  for  a thing  at  the  highest  level  of  the  personality, 
and  at  the  same  time  be  wholly  conscious  of  other  considera- 
tions that  oppose  it,  and  make  the  striving  for  its  object  less 
effective.  Still  others  may,  it  is  thought,  be  unconscious,  - 
and  psychoanalysis  formulates  them  all  in  terms  of  wish  and 


Frederic  Lyman  Wells 


counter-wish.  So  firmly  fixed,  however,  is  the  concept  of 
wish  as  the  expression  of  the  organic  ‘‘majority,”  that  its 
persistent  employment  in  the  psychoanalytic  sense  only 
confuses  those  who  want  to  comprehend  it  and  encourages 
those  who  do  not. 

A far  preferable  starting  point  is  the  principle  of  am- 
bivalence, but  best  of  all  is  the  concept  of  ambitendency,  as 
developed,  for  example,  by  Bleuler.  One  occasionally  ob- 
serves a psychoanalytic  writer  to  use  the  terms  trend  or 
tendency  as  the  entire  equivalents  of  wish,  and  it  would  be 
well  if  they  largely  replaced  it.  After  all,  the  objective 
evidence  of  wish  is  only  in  terms  of  behavior.  It  has  been 
remarked  that  we  know  a thing  as  we  react  more  certainly, 
or  in  any  way  more  effectively  according  to  it.  In  like 
manner,  the  unity  at  different  levels  of  trends  or  wishes  is 
given  in  the  certainty  and  effectiveness  of  reaction  towards 
them.  When  all  levels  of  the  personality  are  united,  if 
they  ever  are,  in  the  direction  of  a given  trend,  there  is  not 
only  the  conscious  wish  therefor,  but  all  reactions  of  the 
organism  are  definitely  ordered  towards  it.  In  so  far  as 
instinctive  trends  conflict,  and  there  is  a division  of  organic 
policy,  in  so  far  are  the  biological  reactions  of  the  personality 
not  consistently  ordered  towards  the  paramount  end,  but 
isturbed  by  reactions  the  expression  of  other  tendencies 
inconsistent  with  it. 

It  seems  certain  that  the  psychological  failure  to  assimi- 
late a large  part  of  the  phenomena  implied  in  psycho- 
pathology of  every-day  life  is  not  so  much  a reaction 
against  the  above  general  principle  they  represent,  as  against 
certain  interpretations  of  specific  episodes.  In  presenting 
this  phase  of  the  subject,  psychoanalysts  have  an  unfortu- 
nate tendency  to  bring  into  the  foreground  some  bit  of 
analysis  forensically  impressive  if  you  believe  it,  but  not 
wearing  a clear  aspect  of  validity  to  the  casual  observer.  In 
illustrating  a general  principle,  as  that  gross  Fehlleistungen 
are  the  product  of  disunited  personality,  one  should  not 
simultaneously  try  to  exhibit  one’s  subtlety  of  analytic 
power,  or  this  further  division  of  tendency  will  bring  ruin  to 
both  aims.  The  general  principle  is  all  but  self-evident; 
failure  to  act  in  accordance  with  a given  trend  is  the  most 


6 


On  Formulation  in  Psychoanalysis 


objective  indication  of  counter-trend  there  could  possibly 
be.  But  the  nature  of  the  counter-trend  is  not  given  di- 
rectly in  the  Fehlleistung,  which  indeed,  is  often  capable  of 
opposed  interpretations.  It  is  possible  to  say  justly  that 
the  Fehlleistung  is  in  accord  with  a certain  counter-trend, 
and  may,  in  cumulative  instance,  be  regarded  as  evidence 
of  such  a trend.  A counter-trend  in  accord  with  such 
phenomena  is  often  clearly  present  in  consciousness.  The 
weight  to  be  given  such  evidence  depends  first,  on  the 
degree  of  disharmony  between  the  F ehlleistungen  and  the 
major  ‘‘wishes,”  resp.  trends,  tendencies  or  impulses  of 
the  personality;  and  second,  on  the  degree  of  harmony 
between  them  and  any  given  counter-trend.  The  first 
indicates  the  divided  personality;  the  second,  the  lines  of 
cleavage. 

In  fine,  we  know  introspectively  that  we  may  heartily 
wish  at  one  level  what  is  less  advantageous  at  another. 
But  far  deeper  is  our  knowledge,  from  the  observation  of 
behavior,  that  we  sometimes  react  in  accordance  with  cer- 
tain definite  trends,  and  sometimes  against  them.  There- 
fore, let  us  formulate  our  conceptions  of  the  divisions  in 
personal  tendencies  not  statically  in  terms  of  wish  and 
counter-wish,  which  are  at  best  only  secondary  inferences 
below  the  level  of  introspection,  but  dynamically  in  terms 
of  trend  and  counter-trend,  which  are  the  ultimate  criteria 
of  the  wish,  and  are  present  objectively  at  all  levels  of  be- 
havior. 

In  its  deductions  regarding  the  character  of  personal 
trend  and  counter-trend,  psychoanalysis  describes  various 
situations  in  which  actions  or  mental  events  recur  not  in 
their  original  form,  but  from  some  cause  verstellt.  The 
process  is  a familiar  one  in  daily  life,  and  its  relation  to 
psychoanalysis  is  a question  not  so  much  on  existential 
grounds  as  of  the  precise  sort  of  symbolisms  that  the  psycho- 
analytic method  is  capable  of  establishing,  and  whether  the 
previous  theoretical  formulations  of  them  bear  so  necessary 
a relation  to  psychoanalytic  practice  as  has  been  commonly 
thought.  An  insufficient  distinction  seems  to  have  been 
drawn  between  two  kinds  of  symbolism  that  I shall  try  to 
illustrate  concretely.  If  one  contemplates  a well-grown 


Frederic  Lyman  Wells 


7 


oak  tree,  one  may  naturally  think  of  its  similarity  to  the 
growth  of  the  British  Empire.  The  oak  tree  becomes  to 
him,  for  the  nonce,  a symbol  of  the  British  Empire.  But 
the  development  of  the  British  Empire  has  no  direct  causal 
relation  to  the  growth  of  the  oak  tree.  Britannia  did  not 
create  the  oak  tree  to  see  how  she  looked,  as  nature  is  said 
to  have  created  Goethe.  The  ‘‘enmity”  between  oxygen 
and  fluorine,  which  alone  of  all  elements  forms  no  compound 
with  it,  and  drives  it  out  of  its  stable  union  with  hydrogen, 
to  form  ozone  and  hydrofluoric  acid,  might  very  conceivably 
suggest  to  one  the  hatred  of  Hannibal  for  the  Romans, 
or  the  usurpation  of  Igraine  by  Uther  Pendragon.  In  this 
way  the  one  may  always  be  said  to  symbolize  the  other. 
But  psychoanalysis  uses  the  term  to  mean  much  more  than 
this;  not  only  that  the  one  idea  has  certain  grounds  for 
association  by  similarity  with  the  other,  but  that  it  is  ac- 
tually a genetic  expression  of  the  other.  That  is,  one 
dreams  that  he  is  near  the  summit  of  a mountain,  down  which 
there  flows  a gushing  waterfall;  he  is  thirsty,  but  does  not 
drink.  It  needs  no  highly-colored  imagination  to  associate 
this  episode  with  any  deep-seated  trend,  wish,  if  you  like, 
that  has  to  be  kept  in  the  background,  and  even  to  dovetail 
minute  features  of  the  one  into  features  of  the  other;  but 
it  is  a very  rash  step  further  to  say  that  these  detailed 
features  of  the  one  are  therefore  genetically  determined  by 
the  other. 

The  fact  of  contiguity  in  free  association  is  not  sufficient 
to  establish  one  event  as  symbolic  of  another  in  the  sense 
of  genetic  expression.  This  is  attested  by  the  numerous 
symbolisms  in  which  it  is  not  possible  that  one  should  be 
the  genetic  expression  of  the  other.  Such  instances  as  the 
above  are  supplemented  by  cases  where  differential  sym- 
bolism is  clearly  marked.  In  Titian’s  “Sacred  and  Pro- 
fane Love,”  there  is  a good  deal  of  naive  disagreement  as  to 
which  is  which.  Various  snatches  of  music  may  become 
definitely  associated  in  one’s  mind  with  certain  ideas,  and 
one  is  often  astonished  on  learning  afterwards  how  different 
are  the  ideas  conveyed  in  their  original  names. 

Is  it  not  better  to  freely  admit  that  we  have  no  objective 
criterion  of  genetic  expression  in  dream  and  much  other 


8 


On  Formulation  in  Psychoanalysis 


symbolism,  but  that  the  length  to  which  one  is  willing  to 
go  in  accepting  such  interpretations  is  a matter  of  personal 
equation?  When,  as  Ernest  Jones  remarks,  the  chief 
character  of  the  “Servant  in  the  House”  is  called  Alanson, 
the  proposition  that  the  name  represents  “son  of  man”  is 
convincing  to  most  of  us;  we  should  assume  it  without  so 
much  as  inquiring  whether  such  an  idea  was  really  present 
in  the  author  of  the  play.  Again,  when  I forget  to  bring 
away  a five  thousand  ohm  coil  that  I need,  some  of  you 
would  doubtless  be  inclined  to  regard  this  as  determined  in 
large  part  by  a wish  to  get  rid  of  some  other  species  of 
“resistance.”  Others  would  scarcely  accept  this  view,  and 
no  objective  grounds  could  be  adduced  for  doing  so.  The 
most  extreme  cases  of  this  nature  are,  perhaps,  to  be  found 
in  the  analyses  of  the  “free  selection”  of  numbers.  That 
it  is  possible,  through  various  analytic  sinuosities,  to  relate 
these  choices  to  special  trends  in  the  individual,  serves,  of 
course,  to  discover  the  special  trends,  but  should  not  be 
offered  as  proof  that  these  trends  were  productive  in  the 
selection  of  the  numbers  involved. 

This  brings  us  to  the  first  of  the  two  issues  on  the  co- 
structive  side;  What  is  really  brought  out  by  these  analyses, 
and  how  ought  their  findings  to  be  stated  so  as  to  keep  within 
the  limits  of  scientific  formulation?  The  dream,  the  asso- 
ciation experiment,  the  Symptomhandlungen,  all  lead,  through 
the  free  association  method  that  is  the  base  of  psychoanalytic 
technique,  to  very  full  understanding  of  the  dynamics  of  the 
individual’s  mental  life.  The  same  goal  could  probably  be 
reached,  by  the  same  method,  from  any  other  mental  start- 
ing point,  but  these  seem  to  lie  on  very  direct  routes.  For 
all  that  has  been  claimed  for  the  psychoanalytic  method 
teleologically,  it  is  not  necessary  to  suppose  that  a mental 
event  was  the  symbol  of  its  ex  post  facto  association  any 
more  than  it  is  rationally  wise  to  do  so.  Analysis  is  con- 
cerned with*  the  discovery  of  trends  and  their  genesis,  and 
is  in  no  way  dependent  upon  the  attachment  of  any  special 
significance  to  something  from  which  in  free  association 
these  trends  are  more  or  less  indirectly  derived.  The  es- 
sential thing  is  that  a was  associated  with  h and  then  to  r, 
which  leads  us  further  to  know  the  existence  of  d;  not  that 


Frederic  Lyman  Wells 


9 


a a.s  a.  dream-phenomenon  was  the  symbolic  product  of 
b,  c or  d,  which  it  need  be  neither  in  theory  nor  fact. 

Thus,  the  second  issue,  of  the  precise  criteria  of  sym- 
bolism., becomes  of  a less  fundamental  nature.  The  value 
of  an  association  in  determining  a symbolism,  depends  upon 
the  fixity  and  invariability  of  that  association.  Cat  is  a 
symbol  for  a certain  animal,  because  it  regularly  represents 
to  us  that  animal.  If  in  the  content  of  myths,  dreams  or 
schizophrenia,  an  object  is  represented  performing  func- 
tions unequivocally  attached  to  another  object,  the  first 
object  may  be  regarded  as  symbolic  of  the  second;  the  air, 
for  example,  as  symbolic  of  the  procreative  principle.  Some- 
times the  Verstellung  is  very  slight,  so  that  the  symbolism 
seems  given  directly  to  the  content;  as  in  Manson  on  page 
8,  or  when  a dreamed-of  mountain,  named  Chickatoharie, 
appears  as  the  fusion  of  Chickatawbut  and  Canajoharie. 
To  these  should,  perhaps,  be  added  the  cases  in  which  there 
is  a certain  immediate  awareness  of  the  Verstellung^  as  in 
some  phenomena  described  by  Hollingworth.  Such  are  the 
evidences  by  which  symbolism  is  determined;  it  depends  on 
one’s  self  how  strong  they  must  be  before  symbolism  is  ac- 
cepted as  “convincing.” 

Last,  and  perhaps  most  important,  are  the  issues  in- 
volved in  the  psychoanalytic  conception  of  sexuality.  Few 
phases  of  these  doctrines  can  have  done  more  harm  to  their 
own  cause  or  to  the  cause  of  truth.  Where  the  function  of 
science  should  be  to  delimit  our  concepts  and  give  them 
clearer  meanings,  psychoanalysis  has  reduced  this  term  to 
the  level  of  an  affective  expression,  deprived  of  every  conno- 
tation that  gives  it  a distinctive  place  in  the  language  of 
realistic  thinking. 

We  are  all  familiar  with  the  protests  that  arise  against 
psychoanalysts  assigning  a sexual  significance  to  so  many 
human  activities,  and  we  are  equally  familiar  with  the 
answer  — that  we  do  not  understand  Freud’s  conception 
of  sexuality,  and,  anyway,  we  are  simply  making  an  exhibit 
of  our  cultivated  resistances  to  a proper  recognition  of  this 
factor.  Now  we  have  no  objection  to  calling  a spade  a 
spade  when  it  is  impossible  to  call  it  a lily;  but  it  is  very 
perplexing  when  our  colleagues  employ  the  term  to  designate 


10 


On  Formulation  in  Psychoanalysis 


clubs,  hearts,  diamonds  and  no  trumps.  Anaxagoras  said 
that  snow  was  black,  challenging  any  one  to  disprove  his 
assertion;  and  by  quite  similar  process  do  you  assert  that 
the  Wonnesaugen  of  the  month-old  infant  is  a ^‘sexual” 
reaction.  Assuredly  it  is  true  that  the  numerous  elementary 
activities  which  you  have  characterized  in  this  way  are 
determined  by  a unitary  guiding  principle;  but  is  it  on  that 
or  any  account  wise  and  just  to  call  that  principle  sexual? 

By  far  the  most  fundamental  point  is  never  to  lose 
sight  of  the  relational  implications  of  the  term.  It  is  im- 
possible to  insist  too  strongly  on  this  essential  feature  of  its 
significance.  The  sexual  character  of  an  organism  is  given 
in  a certain  objective  biological  relation  to  other  organisms. 
Sexual  reactions  primarily  represent  the  functioning  of  these 
characters  as  such.  And  to  meet  a consistent  criterion  of 
sexuality,  the  reaction  should  conform  to  one  of  two  condi- 
tions; it  must  be  a reaction  to  an  object  of  sexual  character 
determined  by  the  sexual  character  of  that  object;  or  second, 
it  must  be  known  as  a symbol  or  derivative  of  such  a re- 
action. 

What  seems  to  have  actually  happened  in  the  minds  of 
those  responsible  for  the  dilution  to  infinity  of  the  sexual 
concept,  is  that  the  word  has  become  identified  with  and 
displaced  the  broader  concept  of  the  hedonic.^  Organisms 
tend,  in  the  most  multiform  ways,  to  all  sorts  of  activities 
that  result  in  pleasure.  ' These  activities  usually,  but  not 
necessarily,  run  parallel  to  those  resulting  in  the  objective 
advancement  of  the  organism  or  its  species;  among  human 
beings  the  conflict  is  particularly  marked.  We  do  not 
clearly  know  the  role  of  the  hedonic  factor  in  determining 
the  reaction,  but  natural  selection  would,  of  course,  tend  to 
the  survival  of  those  organisms  in  which  the  hedonic  and 
beneficial  factors  were  best  combined.  The  essential  thingfor 
us  is  the  fundamental  organic  property  of  preserving  those 
reactions  which  bring  pleasure,  and  giving  up  those  which 
do  not.  This  is  properly  formulated  in  psychoanalysis 
as  the  Lustprinzip,  or  pleasure  principle.  To  some  extent, 
this  principle  doubtless  determines  reaction-trends  consti- 
tutionally, as  we  know  that  co-ordinated  series  of  responses 
may  be  inherited;  to  some  extent  it  is,  doubtless,  also  a proc- 


Frederic  Lyman  Wells 


11 


ess  of  trial  and  error  adjustment.  Human  beings  are 
physiologically  so  constituted  that  the  great  part  of  the 
elementary  pleasures  are  derived  through  the  stimulation 
and  activity  of  various  but  rather  definite  areas,  different 
portions  of  mucous  surface,  the  alimentary  canal,  and  the 
like.  It  is  a great  anticipatory  misnomer  to  call  these  the 
“erogenous  zones”  in  childhood;  the  erotic  function,  of 
such  as  develop  one  at  all,  is  quite  subsequent  and  secondary. 
Only  from  our  knowledge  that  in  the  life  history  of  the 
individual  certain  of  these  trends  do  later  take  on  a sexual 
character,  do  we  regressively  irradiate  this  adjective  over 
all  of  them,  and  because  the  child  reacts  upon  the  various 
pleasure  areas  rather  unselectively,  characterize  a doubt- 
fully sexual  disposition  with  the  unhappy  cacophemism  of 
polymorph  pervers.  I should  sooner  apply  the  term  to 
Freud’s  conception  of  sexuality.  What  we  have  to  start 
with  are  a number  of  possibilities  for  pleasurable  reaction, 
between  which  a developmental  selection  takes  place,  and 
for  the  best  of  evolutionary  reasons,  those  are  the  most 
likely  to  survive  and  flourish,  which  are  involved  with  the 
reproductive  instinct.  But,  of  course,  the  underlying 
Lusttrieh  of  the  organism  may  develop  in  various  ways,  with- 
out relation  even  to  the  genital  areas,  not  to  mention  sex- 
uality. While  a young  boy  is  defecating  in  a field,  a stray 
dog  comes  up  and  licks  his  posteriors.  If  the  orgastic  sensa- 
tions thus  experienced  lead  to  a repetition  of  this  or  allied 
practices  described  by  the  child  Gargantua,  there  might 
well  result  a serious  deviation  from  the  normal  development 
of  the  instinct  trends,  but  it  would  furnish  the  last  of  reasons 
for  being  called  a sexual  reaction.  Better  indeed  to  term 
it  an  anti-sexual  reaction,  since  it  would  inhibit  and  distort 
the  normal  development  of  the  sexual  instinct  proper. 

Yet  one  should  probably  go  further  than  this,  and  point 
out  that  the  primary  involvement  of  the  genital  tract  is  not 
of  itself  sufflcient  to  determine  the  sexual  character  of  the 
reaction.  Thus  we  do  not  regard  every  reaction  as  loco- 
motor because  the  foot  takes  part  in  it.  Lamairesse  makes 
mention  somewhere  of  a Hindu  priest  who  is  represented 
gazing  steadily  at  an  image  of  the  god  Krshna,  and,  in  the 
course  of  devotion,  masturbates.  Whether  such  a reaction 


12  On  Formulation  in  Psychoanalysis 

is  to  be  regarded  as  sexual  must  depend  upon  the  psychic 
factor;  as  a mere  manifestation  of  religious  ecstasy,  it  is 
no  more  sexual  than,  under  like  circumstances,  are  the  tears 
and  contortions  of  the  mourners’  bench.  Suppose  a child 
isolated  from  birth  from  all  human  contacts,  kept  alive  and 
cared  for  through  wholly  mechanical  means;  no  more  sexual 
significance  could  attach  to  his  masturbation  than  to  any 
other  of  his  actions.  The  same  may  be  observed  with  the 
stupors  of  profound  idiocy,  individuals  of  no  traceable  sex 
consciousness,  in  whom  the  process  bears  the  aspect  of  the 
simplest  of  sensory-motor  arcs,  scarcely  less  automatic  than 
the  scratch-reflex  of  a spinal  animal.  Do  you  propose  to 
dignify  such  activities  with  the  name  of  sexual.^ 

We  see,  therefore,  that  quite  independently  of  sexual 
trends,  the  hedonic  reactions  associated  with  the  genital 
sphere  are  apt  to  assume  primacy  among  their  congeners. 
Under  normal  environment,  this  trend  deepens  and  becomes 
predominantly  responsive  to  individuals  of  opposite  sex, 
occasionally  also  to  the  same,  or  to  stimuli  experientially 
associated  with  them.  These  reactions  and  those  of  all 
other  areas  take  on  a sexual  character  only  as  they  are 
determined  by  the  sexual  character  of  the  object;  real  or 
imaginary,  actual  or  symbolic.  Other  phases  of  the  under- 
lying Lusttrieh  either  fade  into  obscurity  or  are  assimilated 
to  sexual  reactions  (Partialtriehe);  some  preserve  an  inde- 
pendent existence,  most  notably  the  hedonic  reactions 
associated  with  the  taking  of  food,  because  of  the  equally 
fundamental  character  of  this  instinctive  trend. 

We  ought  not  to  apply  the  term  sexual  to  reactions  for 
no  better  reason  than  that  some  time  in  the  life  history  of 
the  individual  they  may  or  may  not  become  associated  with 
specifically  sexual  trends.  Psychogenesis,  in  the  sexual 
sphere  as  elsewhere,  is  progressive,  not  retroactive.  Possibly 
a useful  temporary  purpose  has  been  served  by  extending 
the  term  to  cover  all  phases  of  Lusttrieh,  thus  clearly  pointing 
out  the  unitary  character  of  the  principle  underlying  them, 
but  it  is  exceedingly  unfortunate  when  such  metonymies 
are  thought  of  literally.  For  the  formulation  of  such  re- 
actions as  regularly  become  subservient  to  the  Sexualtrieh 
proper,  or,  if  they  do  not  do  so,  tend  especially  to  block  its 


Frederic  Lyman  Wells 


13 


proper  development,  we  mdght  maintain  the  indication  of 
their  most  important  relationship  in  the  designation  of  para- 
sexual  reactions. 

By  definition,  the  Sexualtrieh  should  be  directly  or 
symbolically  objectified,  but  it  is  not  clear  that  the  Objekt- 
trieh  should  be  entirely  included  within  it.  Profound 
idiots  at  times  seize  the  hand  of  a neighbor  and  masturbate 
themselves  with  it.  The  question  is  again  how  far  the  re- 
action is  determined  by  the  sexual  character  of  the  object. 
And  the  same  criterion  must  apply  along  the  range  up  to  the 
whole  group  of  sister-,  cousin-  and  aunt-complexes,  somie  of 
them  assuredly  of  sexual  character. 

The  principal  word  of  constructive  criticism  in  psycho- 
analysis is  then.  Look  to  your  formulations!  Let  no  one 
elude  this  issue  with  the  idea  that  it  is  unim.portant  as  a mere 
matter  of  words.  No  phase  of  psychoanalysis  is  unim- 
portant that  is  an  essential  factor  for  its  judgmient  and 
appreciation  as  a department  of  science,  and  is,  to-day, 
responsible  for  much  of  the  negativistic  attitude  in  those 
quarters  from  which  the  first  encouragement  should  have 
come.  Examine  these  theories  of  mental  function  squarely, 
and  with  the  same  freedom  of  resistance  as  is  urged  upon 
those  who  look  to  you  for  help.  Has  due  care  been  exer- 
cised to  keep  the  interpretation  of  your  splendid  body  of 
observational  data  within  the  limits  of  what  they  really 
showed,  or  is  it  often  subordinated  to  impressiveness  of 
statement,  with  just  a tinge  of  what  we  clinically  know  as 
the  “desire  to  astonish”.^  Have  you  never  said  “Freud 
has  discovered,”  where  he  only  surmised.^  The  same  loose- 
ness of  formulation  that,  perhaps,  facilitated  their  applica- 
bility to  data  of  clinical  observation,  has  unquestionably 
retarded  their  assimilation  with  the  more  rigid  standards  of 
experimental  proof.  In  the  correction  of  these  conditions 
lies  the  best  hope  of  mutually  supportive  progress. 


